Muhammed Nawaz Khan's Page

Latest Activity

Muhammed Nawaz Khan updated their profile
Oct 2, 2013
Muhammed Nawaz Khan and Syed Ameer Ali are now friends
Jul 6, 2012
Muhammed Nawaz Khan is now friends with OLALEKAN D MICHAEL-AINA and Gilda Bettencourt
Apr 12, 2012
Muhammed Nawaz Khan shared their blog post on Facebook
Mar 29, 2012
Muhammed Nawaz Khan commented on Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
"If you wanna to do...you can do...only determination provides the way....:-)"
Mar 24, 2012
Santhosha Kumari liked Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
Mar 23, 2012
Gladys Tiffany liked Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
Mar 22, 2012
Johnnie Special One Jackson commented on Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
"Fantastic, a great piece, right to the point no waffle. More of us need to team up as track 2 negotiators and work with these groups, but too often we work alone or wait for an NGO to take us on. Since the peace was signed off in my own country, I…"
Mar 22, 2012
Wamala Twaibu commented on Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
"waoooooooooooooo that great you have real analysed the political concept"
Mar 22, 2012
Bendik liked Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
Mar 22, 2012
Arif Khalil commented on Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
"A very timely post to build a serious strategy..."
Mar 22, 2012
Arif Khalil liked Muhammed Nawaz Khan's blog post Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups
Mar 22, 2012
Muhammed Nawaz Khan posted a blog post

Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups

Peace and Conflict MonitorSPECIAL REPORTNon-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed GroupsMuhammed Nawaz KhanDecember 09, 2010Muhammed Nawaz Khan provides a comprehensive analysis of opportunities and challenges for interaction between non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan. If such interactions are approached strategically and in a principled way, Khan argues, NSAGs may be brought into…See More
Mar 21, 2012
Muhammed Nawaz Khan and Liviu Constantin Caliman are now friends
Dec 18, 2011
Tamar Bortsvadze and Muhammed Nawaz Khan are now friends
Jul 7, 2011
Muhammad Tahir Tabassum left a comment for Muhammed Nawaz Khan
"Dear Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Warmly Welcome to join INSPAD Peace Group in Peace Network. Its common platform for peace-makers to share knowledge, experience and achievement. Please must in touch with us regularly, we will up date you time to time. You…"
Mar 17, 2011

Profile Information

Please feel free to provide a short bio about yourself or the work of your organization (no more than 3 paragraphs)
I am a Assistant Research Officer at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad.My academic background is, Bachelors in Arts with major in Political Science and Journalism, M.Sc in Defence and Strategic Studies (1994-196) from Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad. Before joining IPRI I have served as Police Officer in Punjab, Pakistan. During my service I underwent Advanced Investigation Course (2002) in addition to other related training courses. I have also got Training of Trainers (TOT) for Master Trainers Programme Co-sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Royal Norwegian Embassy conducted at Administrative Staff College, Lahore, in 2006.My areas of interest include Security dynamic of South Asia, while currently I am working on Counter-Terrorism specially the “De-Radicalisation and Disengagement Phenomena as Experienced in Northern Europe, Middle East and Far East and Lessons for Pakistan.” Ialso focuse on strategic issues and political developments around the world with special focus on Terrorism related issues and “Softer Power” Counter-Radicalisation.
Please indicate if you're joining PCDN as an individual or organization (please mark the appropriate category)
think tank
Please list the countries and/or regions in which you (or your organization) have direct and significant expertise
South Asia
What is your current country of residence (or location of your organization)?
Pakistan
What is your current job (and organization) and/or where and what field are you studying?
Research Officer
How many years professional experience do you have ?
1-2
What is your personal or organizational website?
http://www.ipripak.org
Which are your primary sectoral areas of expertise (or the primary sectoral areas of your organization) ?
Conflict Mainstreaming, Conflict Resolution, Development, Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Policing, Security, Terrorism
Which are your primary skills areas(or the primary skill areas of your organization)?
Research
What are some of your current areas of research (if any)?
Terrorism Especially " De-radicalisation"
If appropriate feel free to list several of your (or your organization's) publications
1. Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Challenges and the Strategic Path Forward.
2.Kerry-Lugar Bill: Between the lines
3.Kerry-Lugar Bill: Enmeshing in a net

Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Challenges and the Strategic Path Forward

Appearing as a testing battlefield to check the balance of power during Soviet invasion, the war-torn Afghanistan afterwards plunged into the vicious whirlpool. In the aftermath of Geneva Accord of 1988, Afghanistan suddenly fell into wrecked isolation by the dereliction of the global centers of power, coupled with indefinite internal paroxysm leading to protracted civil tug amongst the unarmed war-lords – mostly dominated by the Taliban factions. The consequent scenario wreaked endless havoc with the already weakened Afghan state institutions, fragile infrastructure and flimsy civic bodies. The resulting bloody fiasco with large-scale loss of human lives and displacement of masses led to the abrasive culture of deepening ethnocentricity and sectarian rifts, thus sharply dividing the illiterate and heterogeneous Afghan societal fabric along linguistic and racial lines. The chaotic isolation of Afghanistan poses question to the international observers that had there been engagement with, rather than isolation of, the Taliban despite their reprehensible human rights’ records, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist outfits might not have been able to establish themselves in Afghanistan and still debatable 9/11 would never have occurred.

To uproot the Talibanization of Afghanistan without any concrete evidence of the Taliban’s involvement in 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration’s ‘hard power pre-emptive strike” strategy resulted in protracted military campaign against terrorism with no peace and stability in the region, except establishing fledgling democratic government confronting immense challenges with complete failure to extend its writ beyond the capital, what to say of forging the national unity.

Still paradoxes encompass the counter-terrorism phenomena as observed in the contemporary world today, and it could be seen in the President Barack Obama’s Afghan policy, which tries to do several things, in a piecemeal and inchoate way. The Obama’s axiomatic, visionless and perceptionally diverse Afg-Pak strategy suffers from contradictions by not prioritizing Afghanistan as the insurgencies’ centre of gravity, something also validated by empirical evidences. It has overlooked several aspects, including a concrete political strategy with specifics on how the civilian surge will occur and how democracy and institution-building will be supported, and a plan that distinguishes Al-Qaeda from that of the Taliban insurgency. Relying merely on the hardcore physical military means to achieve quick results because taking the developmental path, in Afghanistan’s circumstances, is likely to take a decade or more to produce substantive results, this miscalculated muscular approach tactically aimed at eradicating Al-Qaeda, has further deteriorated the situation rather than reversing it. It risks miring the US in an un-winnable war without end, amounting to international humiliation and huge domestic backlash.

The extra deployment to Afghanistan is being observed against the US fears to avoid getting bogged down as in the escalating Vietnam War, while putting to secondary-rating the foremost goals of nation-building and reconstruction of the devastated Afghanistan with the consent of Afghan diasporas also including the politically reconcilable Talibans. In fact, the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily unless they are not defeated politically.

Karzai’s somewhat positional strength in Afghanistan does not lie in the reason that the people love Karzai or are happy about his performance. Rather, he is a symbol of real disappointment for the Afghan people because of his poor administration during his last eight years in office which is characterized by deep-rooted corrupt state-craft, ever spiraling drug-trafficking flourishing under official patronages with indefinite insecurities and an environment of misery where even ordinary Afghans cannot find jobs just earning $1 a day. Suffering extreme rates of illiteracy, pervasive ignorance, lowest standards of living, devastated economy mostly flourishing on narco-capital inflows, on the humanitarian front also, Afghanistan has some of the world's worst health indicators, with an average life expectancy of 44.

Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribes, who make up about 38% of the population, remain excluded from power. Afghanistan is a three-legged ethnic stool. The Pashtun tribesmen form over the near half of Afghanistan’s population but have been largely excluded from power by the Western occupation. Taking away the Pashtun leg, stability is impossible in Afghanistan as the Western powers cannot run Afghanistan by using the minority segments ethnically comprising 25% Tajiks, 6% Uzbeks, 19% Hazaras and 12% others.
No government in Afghanistan can function without the active participation of the Pashtuns. The Afghans are fiercely independent society, depicting utter dislike towards an imposed government. The history of Afghanistan is studded with examples proving how the Afghans resisted such efforts and were eventually able to drive the imposed elements. Invariably those who tried to install their own people in seats of power, they eventually had to pay heavy price.

It should primarily be a struggle for winning hearts and minds, in which dialogue and development must be the most potent tool. Based on Cultural-Building-Measures bridging internal gulfs, only a broadly-envisioned Afghan government founded on reconciliatory power-sharing formula, proportionally represented by all ethnic factions of civic society including Pastuns, implying adequate military, political, bureaucratic and institutional bases of all major as well as minor factions in government paraphernalia could only bring long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan. Reflecting all the ethnic shades of Afghan society and various warring factions including the Talibans, this broadly represented state-craft is probably the best option, but the major impediment is how to get them together and secure the much-desired agreement. To realize this objective, an all-encompassing step-by-step strategy needs to be evolved duly coordinated by mutual efforts of both the UN and OIC, working together in consultation of all tiers of the Afghan civic entities, to be ultimately followed by a meeting of all the neighbouring states (primarily bordering countries) held under the aegis of both the UN and OIC, having the recognized mandate to mobilize diplomatic channels in minimizing interests’ incompatibilities of the regional and global players vis-a-vis USA, Russia, Iran, India, China and Pakistan.

Finally, a mini Marshal plan-type plan for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and institution-building of Afghanistan needs to be devised by all regional and global stakeholders with prime consent of the Afghan populace.


Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Ex Police Officer)
Researcher at Islamabad Policy Research Institute Pakistan.

Muhammed Nawaz Khan's Photos

Loading…
  • Add Photos
  • View All

Muhammed Nawaz Khan's Blog

Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups

Posted on March 21, 2012 at 12:33pm 4 Comments

Peace and Conflict Monitor

SPECIAL REPORT

Non-State Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limitations of NGOs Engaging Non-State Armed Groups

Muhammed Nawaz Khan

December 09, 2010

Muhammed Nawaz Khan provides a comprehensive analysis of opportunities and challenges for interaction between non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan. If such interactions are approached strategically and in a principled way, Khan argues, NSAGs…

Continue

WikiLeaks’ Pakistan-fixated Cyber Activism

Posted on August 6, 2010 at 3:00am 0 Comments

Immersed in typical cyber paranoia, the online release of US top secret sensitive compartmented intelligence leaked on July 26 by WikiLeaks.org - a website run by anti-war activist Julian Assange –

have caused a flurry for web-surfing making the international readership

pop-eyed with amazement how the anti-war operators of the website succeeded in

leaking…

Continue

Possible Resuscitation of Afghanistan

Posted on May 2, 2010 at 6:00am 0 Comments

Putting weight to the resolution of Afghanistan scrape as a current stabilizing factor in the region, a retooled politically-sensitive conflict…

Continue

Looking Beyond the London Conference 2010

Posted on January 21, 2010 at 10:30am 0 Comments

With the Afghan sorrows continue to mount; the war on terror is going almost on autopilot, losing sight of the original objectives to be guided by permanent peace in Afghanistan and the region. Against this backdrop, nowadays the media flurry is conventionally being bickered betting high on the probabilities of seismic shifts assisting the war-ravaged Afghanistan towards a relative peace in the wake of forthcoming London Moot scheduled on 28 January 2010, which will be co-hosted by the UK Prime… Continue

Comment Wall (3 comments)

You need to be a member of Peace and Collaborative Development Network to add comments!

Join Peace and Collaborative Development Network

At 1:49am on March 17, 2011, Muhammad Tahir Tabassum said…

Dear Muhammad Nawaz Khan,

Warmly Welcome to join INSPAD Peace Group in Peace Network. Its common platform for peace-makers to share knowledge, experience and achievement.

Please must in touch with us regularly, we will up date you time to time.

You can visit our official website www.inspad.org

Best of luck.

 

At 8:42pm on May 22, 2010, Nasir Shoaib Shah said…
Dear Nawaz, you must join group "South Asia Peacebuilders". It is related to your expertise, and give us chance to learn by you. Thanx.
At 7:26pm on January 5, 2010, Samia Abd Alla Mohammed Ali said…
hello muhammed , nice to meet you in peace and collborative Development group .
i am little bit worry about your country .i hope Alla will bring peace to your country and mine soon .peace for the whole world speically middle east
 
 
 

Sponsored Link

Please Pay What You Can to Support PCDN

Please consider Paying What You Can to help PCDN grow. We encourage you to consider any amount from $1 and up. Read the SUPPORT page prior to making a payment to see PCDN's impact and how your payment will help.

Sponsored Link

Translate This Page



PCDN NETWORK TWITTER FEED

PCDN Guidelines and Share Pages

By using this site you're agreeing to the terms of use as outlined in the community guidelines (in particular PCDN is an open network indexed by Google and users should review the privacy options). Please note individual requests for funding or jobs are NOT permitted on the network.

Click BELOW to share site resources Bookmark and Share
or Share on LINKEDIN


FOLLOW PCDN on TWITTER, FACEBOOK or GOOGLE+

Google+

 

Latest Activity

© 2014   Created by Craig Zelizer.

Badges  |  Report an Issue  |  Terms of Service