Senegal is seen as a model example of West African democracy. It is characterized by democratic structures and the rule of law as well as guaranteed basic freedoms, in particular freedom of religion, free speech, a free press and freedom of assembly. The democratically structured Senegalese army is one of the few African armies to be involved in regional and international peacekeeping missions. The conflict in the south-west of the country, which has been going on for almost 30 years now, however, is barely acknowledged by the rest of the world and Europe in particular. Here, in the Casamance region, Senegalese military and rebel groups affiliated with the Movement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance – MFDC) have been engaged in a seemingly never-ending and bloody fight that is the root cause of many of the hardships faced daily by the local population. Several thousand people have been killed in armed attacks or by landmines. More than 60,000 people have fled or have been driven out of the area. Countless peace treaties between the Senegalese government and the now-fragmented rebel forces have not been able to do any more than temporarily alleviate the situation. Since the fall of 2009 in particular there has been an increased incidence of fighting, prompting the Foreign Office to issue travel warnings. The conflict has taken on a life of its own through a veritable wartime economy and a generation that has grown up with the conflict. But there with an area of 30,000 square kilometers, situated in the south-westernmost part of Senegal, bordering on Guinea-Bissau to the south and separated from the rest of the country by Gambia to the north, the Casamance region is practically an enclave. Where the roots of this conflict lie and what is it that makes it so difficult to resolve these problems? Who are the players and what are the motives that drive them, in the past and today? Above all, what does this conflict mean for society and for the people living in the Casamance region? THE CASAMANCE REGION From the outside, Casamance was seen as distinct from the rest of Senegal for many years, if not from the rest of Africa south of the Sahara. According to Jean-Claude (1994:20) he talks about the European myth of “Casamance” as a region free of drought, hunger or slums. In fact, part of the reason for the longstanding conflict lies in the geographic location and the mentality of the population of the Casamance region. With an area of 30,000 square kilometers, situated in the south-westernmost part of Senegal, bordering on Guinea-Bissau to the South and separated from the rest of the country by Gambia to the North, the Casamance region is practically an enclave. (Chéneau-Locay, 1994) It is sub-divided into the regions of the lower, middle and upper Casamance, of which the lower, with its capital city Ziguinchor, is most affected by the conflict. The lower Casamance is especially well known for its fertile soils, setting it apart from the rest of the country, which is dominated and shaped by the Sahel. Agricultural use, such as fruit orchards, rice fields and vegetable cultivation has replaced a large majority of the natural vegetation of the region. The forests of the Casamance are used intensively for silviculture but not sustainably enough. In addition, oysters are bred in the many distributaries of the Casamance River. Fishing also plays an important role for the local population for consumption purpose. Other elements that contribute towards the livelihood of the people living here are migration to urban regions in the north of the country and to Gambia with the emigrants supporting their families by sending money home. From the 16th through the 19th century, this encompassed part of what today is Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry as well as part of Senegal, particularly the Casamance region. Casamance and the bordering regions still are home to the ethnic groups that, up until a good hundred years ago, lived together in the Gabou Empire and whose extensive networks crossed these international borders. This ethnic diversity did not stop the Casacais from developing a common identity, which differs markedly from that of the Nordistes in terms of values. As a result first and foremost of its enclave position and due to far-reaching economic self-reliance, the peoples of the Casamance region were able to uphold their rich cultural heritage, which is also passed on from generation to generation through their religious beliefs. It is from this commonality of identity among the population of the Casamance region that the separatist MFDC feeds. The ethnic composition within the region is hugely diverse. A majority as Bocounta, (2009) posits belongs to the Jola people, followed by Peul and Mandingue and numerous other ethnic groups. Nowadays, there are also many Wolof in the Casamance region, who represent the majority in the rest of the country and have a dominant position, but here account for only five percent. According to Marut, novelists have romanticized the shared history. The construct of a common culture based on the history of the Gabou Empire was in fact used in functional terms as a means of separation. Movement and their first fighters made a blood pact in the sacred forests. According to animist beliefs, anyone who breaks a pact made in the “bois sacrés” will be cursed. HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE CONFLICT Since 1982 a separatist movement has struggled for political independence for the southernmost region of Senegal. Casamance which lead to protracted armed conflict focused on political dynamics. In 1997 the struggle for the independent Casamance took an unprecedented violent turn. Guerrillas of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) started using landmines, causing casualties among the civilian population. The revolt started in 1982, with a peaceful demonstration that was carefully organised in the sacred groves around Ziguinchor. The majority of the people arrested after the demonstration were indeed Jola but this may have been the result of the authorities’ conviction that the insurgency was a Jola affair. The Jola were considered the principal agents in the revolt and the Senegalese police suspected all members of this ethnic group of being part to the movement.


Researchers on the various fronts put forward different explanations for a conflict which has its roots in colonialism and even further back and which has grown increasingly complex. Who are the rebels and what are their motives now? How does the conflict affect the lives of the local people and how do they deal with this? Historical, political, cultural and socio-economic factors are closely interlinked and in places have developed their own dynamics. The causes of the conflict are multifaceted which will be discussed here briefly. On 26 December 1982, protestors marched into Ziguinchor demanding independence for the Casamance region. They took down the Senegalese flag from government buildings, replacing it with the white flag of Casamance. The Senegalese government was quick to respond. The leaders of the MFDC, which established itself as a political and social movement in 1945, were arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment for attacking the integrity of the nation. These events resulted in the formation of a military wing of the MFDC, which called itself Attika (Jola for ‘fighters’). Following eight years of opposition and violent demonstrations, which were met with growing military and legal force, the nature of the conflict altered. In May 1990, the Attika, sometimes also referred to as the Maquis, attacked military targets as well as civilians accused of cooperating with the government. In response, the army arrested hundreds of people, who were subsequently tortured or executed. The population was caught in the cross-fire between the two fronts. While the Senegalese security forces accused nearly every single person, particularly members of the Jola ethnic group, of collaborating with the MFDC, the freedom movement forced the population to support them. The first ceasefire treaties were concluded in 1991 and 1993, but failed to hold since they did not resolve the issue of independence. In 1995, military measures increased in intensity following the abduction of four French tourists. A new ceasefire treaty was signed in 1999, followed by a peace treaty in 2001. Even this failed to bring about any major improvements. The death in 2007 of MFDC-leader Abbé Diamcoune Senghor, who had been the Senegalese government’s contact person, complicated the situation even further. Since the fall of 2009 there have been growing numbers of armed confrontations following a decrease in the preceding period. The repression of the movement by the Senegalese state, a repression that was also felt by passive supporters of the MFDC’s claims resulted in an ever more sharply defined boundary between supporters of the MFDC and those faithful to the government. This polarisation came about in a dialectic process of state repression and MFDC activity. After the 1982 demonstration, for instance, some civil servants of Casamance extraction were ready to plead their allegiance to President Diouf in public. The MFDC denounced them as ‘traitors of the Casamance Fatherland’, thus establishing a clear boundary between friends and enemies. In MFDC tracts published in 1990, the movement brandished Casamance-born bureaucrats and politicians once again as traitors. The boundaries of the MFDC were indeed well defined and cautiously guarded (Glaise, 1990: 84). Yet the MFDC never overtly claimed an ethnic footing. Probably, the MFDC was from its inception dominated by the Jola. The movement probably enjoyed most of its initial support among the Jola population and expressed feelings of neglect that had also slumbered among other casamançais (Balante, Banyun, Manjak, Mancagne). State repression subsequently led to radicalisation; polarisation led people to entrench themselves in irreconcilable positions. Today, the MFDC is dominated by Jola but the movement is certainly not supported by all Jola. Even if the Jola ethnic group does not monolithically support the MFDC, the separatist movement can justifiably be considered an ‘ethnic’ movement. The autonomously operating members of the MFDC escaped the authority of Father Diamacoune, their secretary-general. On 13 January 1998, Father Diamacoune made an attempt to calm down the undisciplined members of the separatist movement. In a public declaration, he stated: “Brothers and sisters of Casamance! Inadmissible things happen in the land of our ancestors. Landmines cause human suffering. They kill men, women, and children, innocent and unarmed citizens I condemn the perpetrators of these crimes. And I appeal to our traditional ethics to call them to order. Do not rape, do not kill children, women or elders. Niauw!”. Father Diamacoune thus appealed to traditional ethics. Niauw is a Jola term meaning so much as taboo. A traditional interdiction was to prevent the MFDC recruits from displaying unruly behaviour. The MFDC’s discourse was highly charismatic in 1982 and very much attuned towards a local audience. The MFDC is a political force embedded in Casamance society, being profoundly rooted in local forms of religious organisation.


The conflict has taking so many forms which are the social, political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions. However the call for independence by the MFDC was initially supported by a large number of inhabitants of the Casamance region. The government, however, denounced the movement’s coherence, suggesting that the whole affair was a conspiracy led by ‘a few village elders’ who received help from abroad. But it seems very unlikely that the village elders were capable of mobilising a large protest movement. The Senegalese government furthermore denounced the movement by referring to it as an ‘affaire diola’. The movement itself tried to escape accusations of ‘tribalism’ and insisted on its regional footing (Geschiere & van der Klei, 1988). The question is to what extent do the popular support for the MFDC went beyond the boundaries of the Jola ethnic group? However, the course of the conflict has been intermittent with time over years but the consciousness of the conflict was rooted amongst the people as far back as 1945 when leaders of the MFDC, which established itself as a political and social movement in 1945, were arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment for attacking the integrity of the nation. This particular event gave vent to other conflict which majorly took off on 26 December 1982 when protestors marched into Ziguinchor demanding independence for the Casamance region by taking down of Senegalese flag from government buildings and replacing it with the white flag of Casamance. However, the conflict has been in an un orchestrated form which hasn’t been managed to a satisfactory level for there to be a relative peace in the region.


The discovery and occupation of the Casamance region by the Portuguese, followed by the British and finally the French, and the eventual independence of Senegal in 1960, including the Casamance region, all had far-reaching consequences. The longstanding resistance movement in the Casamance began under the colonial rule of the Portuguese from 1645 and continued until the French took power. In the eyes of the “colonial masters”, the Jola had “an impulsive temperament, which resists every authoritarian principle” Bocounta (2009). Later, missionaries noted that the region around Ziguinchor in the South-West of the country in particular had not yet been “pacified”, and complained about the local people’s “lack of willingness to cooperate” During the First World War, the Jola resistance increased dramatically, primarily as a result of the enforced conscription of young men to fight in the French forces Bocounta (2009). The families of those killed in the war grew desperate and angry, and expressed their frustrations by honoring and lending their support to the young queen of Cabrousse, Eline Sitoé Diatta. She opposed colonial rule and the oppression of the population it entailed. In 1942, she led the population in a revolution and went down in the history of the country as the ‘Joan of Arc’ of the Casamance region. Eline Sitoé Diatta was arrested in 1943 and banished to exile, from which she never returned. She had many successors and even today, the image of the women who protected their country and their families is still reflected in the armed wing of the separatist MFDC.


However, in order to understand the basis of movement or struggle by the separatist movement towards independence we need to understand the factors behind this movement which are based on cultural ideology or performance. In understanding the insurgencies and armed conflict of Cassamance grievance which seeks to provide a cultural understanding for the dynamics of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC). The MFDC is a political force profoundly rooted in local forms of religious organisation. In exploring the ‘cultural models of performance’ that structured the MFDC and its relation towards its constituency, two cultural models of performance are delineated which are “prophecy and secrecy”. The first model is based on prophecy which has a long tradition in Casamance, especially among the Jola ethnic group. Father Diamacoune Senghor, MFDC’s leader, is profoundly influenced by a local prophetess who preached in the 1940s, and he believes that her prophecy (independence) is still relevant today. However, inconsistencies within his messianic discourse led to the loss of popular support and the MFDC ‘routinised’ into a secret society. The second cultural model of performance on which the MFDC is based on is secrecy which is equally well as equally well rooted in Jola cultural practices. As a secret society, MFDC has become a channel of communication towards the national regime, constituting an alternative model of state-society mediation in Senegal. The MFDC is a popular mode of political action based on the transformation of these cultural models but MFDC has not succeeded in merging these two inherently contradictory models. However it is seen that the ‘fatal logic’ in MFDC’s prophecy led to the routinisation of the MFDC into a secret society (Fabian, 1991). It should not be taking that in addressing cassamance conflict cultural approach is being favoured but the making of the MFDC is the result of a cultural disposition of the Jola ethnic group, current understanding of the conflict among the Senegalese public. It has been argued that the making of the MFDC was a result of the absence of communication between a centralised patrimonial state and local, predominantly segmentary social structures (Darbon, 1988; Friebe, 1996). We should thus interpret the MFDC as a mode of political engagement with, and within the Senegalese state. There are major links between the cultural dimension of the Casamance conflict and the historical-political development of the region. Two cultural characteristics play a central role in the conflict and the resolution thereof.Firstly, the Jola in particular oppose every form of state authority. In fact, the only authorities they respect and revere are the “High Priests” of the villages, known as Aloenba, and the clan leaders. In the Jola tribe, a clan encompasses all those descended from the same male ancestors. As a rule, the eldest is their leader and is supported by a clan council. While the clan council exercises the legislative power, the leader takes the role of the executive. Generally there will be several clans living together in a village or town, each of which nominates a representative to the town council. In addition to the individual towns and villages, there is also a national council with regional powers. It is composed of delegations from the towns and villages, as well as direct members known as Hunir and the elected king. Secondly, the Jola’s Clan system is also closely linked with the belief in certain fetishes (objects believed to have supernatural powers) which influence important decisions. In addition to the fetish priests of each clan, there are ancestral cults and fetishist beliefs relating to the family ancestry. The supreme fetish priest and charismatic leader is the king, who ensures solidarity between the various families. The initiation into the fetishist culture takes place in the sacred forests (Bois Sacrés). Here, the initiated meet and contact supernatural powers. It is here that important decisions are taken, including calling upon the ancestors to provide supernatural guidance. The historian Noah Cissé reports that in the wake of the events of December 1982, the leaders of the separatist movement and their first fighters made a blood pact to fight with their lives for the independence for the Casamance region in the sacred woods surrounding Ziguinchor. This pact has continued among MFDC members to this day. According to animist beliefs, anyone who breaks a pact made in the sacred woods in respect of one of the deceased will be cursed. The Senegalese government’s lack of respect for the Jola culture and its failure to incorporate magic-religious elements when justifying the armed conflict make it even more difficult to resolve the situation.


The Casamance region has resources that Senegal otherwise lacks. Foreign currency earned through fishing and tourism in particular represents important potential opportunities for the development of the country. However, the development of the region is limited by its enclave position and the lack of developed infrastructure. The country is sinking into poverty - with negative consequences for the tourism. Above all, the lack of proper administration of agricultural areas has led to a worsening of the social and economic conditions. Even the colonial rulers showed little interest in the Casamance. Infrastructure development was carried out in the four Senegalese municipalities through municipal law: Dakar, Goree, Saint Louis and Rufisque. This marginalization of the South led to a feeling of inferiority among the population of Casamance. The situation was aggravated further by the fact that in the 19th century the colonial leaders relocated Nordistes to Casamance, initially only to break up the close-knit structures and the resistance of the Casacais. Later, arable land was handed over to the Nordistes, leading to opposition from the local rice farmers, which the French colonial powers countered with military attacks. In the mid-19th century the independence movement of the Casacais against France came into existence. For greater control, at the end of the 19th century the French increasingly often appointed Senegalese from the North as village leaders. A socio-environmental principle in Casamance is that the soil and forests, especially the sacred forests, which are inviolable, cannot be sold. The government development policy since Senegal gained independence, coupled with the arbitrary wing of the MFDC to finance its operations. There is also the cannabis trade that has taken on a life of its own. Award of arable land and the lack of respect for traditional cultural values have built an almost insurmountable wall between the Casacais and the immigrants from the North.An additional problem is the increasing salination of the soil, which has caused agricultural land to become scarce. This salination is a result inter alia of deforestation for peanut cultivation, which was introduced from the North. Furthermore, the construction of new residential settlements, where housing is given to Wolofs at low prices, led in the 1970s to the widespread destruction of sacred forests. This established an image of the Nordistes as intruders and “the dominant race”. While Senghor, the country’s first president, avoided appointing prefects and governors belonging to the Wolof ethnic group in the region, today the administration in Casamance is again largely in the hands of the Wolof. This has cemented the Casacais’ prejudice. Another economic aspect that has been especially instrumental in the continuation of the conflict is the wartime economy that has established itself in the region, and beyond. The drugs trade in particular has expanded far beyond the borders of Casamance. Used initially by the military wing of the MFDC to finance its operations, the cannabis trade has taken on a life of its own. Nowadays, doors are open to wide range of players, even those without political objectives. Diallo points out that war in Sierra Leone and Nigeria play just as great a role as do the uncontrollable borders with Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. In addition to several hundred tons of cannabis, drugs raids by the national police force have also uncovered considerable sums of money in various currencies. The cross-border arms trade, first and foremost with Guinea-Bissau, has also become a fixed part of the established wartime economy. Guinea-Bissau’s accession to the Monétaires Ouest-Africains (West African Monetary Union) led to a severe worsening of the living standards due to the alignment of prices with those in the neighboring countries. This has led many Bissau-Guinean soldiers to rent out their weapons to MFDC members in order to make extra money. Trade in weapons with other countries also plays a role West Africa has an arms trade involving an estimated eight million small arms and light weapons. Porous borders and coastal zones that cannot be sufficiently controlled further promote circulation.


According to contextual analysis of the studies consulted for this essay, it was gathered that year 2000, the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, publicly accused Libya, the Ukraine, China and Russia of supplying the Maquis arms and support to fuel the conflict. The MFDC denied these accusations. Furthermore, it is assumed that rebels in Sierra Leone and Liberia also supply weapons to the Maquis.(Evans 2004). The interests of those involved in the arms trade are without a doubt also impeding the resolution of the conflict, this goes beyond tackling the issue in a single context problem but a multi-faceted problem since the conflict has moved outside the host communities thereby having distortions and interest by third parties. The fragmentation and formation of various factions within the MFDC guerrilla has made negotiations even more difficult. Originally one unit, two main groups soon emerged within the guerrilla movement. There were also further splits within these groups, which made it difficult to differentiate the one from the other and even today they are still in transition. As a result of ceasefire negotiations in April 1992 in Guinea Bissau, the movement split into a Northern and a Southern front, separated geographically by the Casamance River. Even the fact that the talks were held in the neighbouring country illustrates the cross-border nature of the conflict. The MFDC was represented by rebel leader Sidy Badji. Father Diamacoune Senghor, the founder of the resistance movement, criticized the fact that the main goal of the movement, namely the independence of Casamance, was not even the subject of negotiations. It was on this basis that Badji and his followers established the Northern front and halted active fighting against the government. In spite of this, it would be wrong to assume that the North at least had been pacified at this point in time. The Northern front continued its illegal activities. Since 2001, the ceasefire between the Northern front and the army has been uplifted again. The reason the Senegalese army intended to establish military bases in the region. In 2003, a further splinter group formed within the Northern front, which apparently exercises great influence. The relationship between the Northern and Southern fronts is characterized by intermittent violent infighting. Until today, the fragmentation of the Northern front has increased further. There are also conflicts within the individual fronts, meaning that splinter groups are also involved in the personalities contributing to the conflict in the casmance region. Despite protestations by individual MFDC leaders, ethnic criteria are blatantly the motivation behind many attacks, as demonstrated by the many murders of members of the Manjak, Mandingue, Balante or Mancagne ethnic groups.


After almost 30 years in the forests, it is very difficult for the rebels to change their lifestyle. Many have not learnt a trade or profession. Also, former agricultural workers who wish to return to society are confronted with various difficulties. During their absence, which often spanned a period of many years, their land was given to others. This leaves them with very few options for a new start. Since President Abdoullaye Wade came into power in 2000, there has been more or less direct contact with the Maquis in the course of peace talks. Following the abandonment of all preceding negotiations by his predecessor, Diouf, and Wade’s announcement that he intended to resolve the Casamance conflict in 100 days, he appointed General Abdoullaye Fall as mediator in 2002. Using audio and video tapes, fall attempted to contact the Maquis. He informed them that the army had been ordered to retreat and offered them amnesty in return for them laying down their arms. The Maquis, confused by Wade’s new policy, returned to armed fighting. Wade responded with more stringent law enforcement and the destruction of rebel bases in 2003. From September 2004 onwards, the situation appeared to have stabilized as a result of various meetings between the government and the MFDC. This temporary peace enabled many refugees to return home. People began to rebuild their lives. On December 30, 2004, new peace treaties were signed. However, not all MFDC factions were involved, resulting in renewed violent clashes. Wade felt betrayed and withdrew funding from the region. The conflict intensified once more. New peace talks on neutral soil in Fundjul in the Kaolack region in January 2005 were nothing more than political discourse, which was not followed by actions. Particularly since the death of Abbé Diamacoune Senghors in January 2007, who for many years acted as the link between the MFDC and the Senegalese government, the situation again has become more complicated. The Attika began fighting again on August 20, 2009. The current situation in the spring of 2010, with new reports of attacks in Casamance, shows that the conflict is far from being resolved. Wade’s strategy is considered by observers as an awaiting of signs of fatigue in the MFDC.


The Casamance conflict has taken on the dimensions of an international affair, in which diverse economic and political interests have become entangled. It is difficult to evaluate how great the president’s interest in resolving the conflict actually is. As for his predecessors, independence for the Casamance region is not on his agenda. He also rejects alternatives such as an autonomous status for Casamance. Ultimately, the conflict does not threaten the existence of the Senegalese state. However, what is problematic is the image cast on a country that likes to portray itself as a model of African democracy by a conflict that has already lasted thirty years. The measures taken by the Senegalese forces have doubtless become more measured and cautious than in the past. Nevertheless, criticism is repeatedly voiced with regards to their approach. For instance, there are reports that journalists are still being arrested; in addition, a Senegalese correspondent for Radio France International, who was accused of one-sided reporting of the Casamance conflict, was expelled from Senegal. (Foucher, et al. 2004) The Casamance conflict poses a serious threat to Wade’s international credibility. There are also some interesting economic aspects. Lasting peace in the region is a prerequisite for both the exploitation of natural resources and income from tourism. However, in order to be able to establish lasting peace, the causes of the conflict have to be dealt with. As long as the complex factors outlined above, which range from historical-political developments to cultural to socio-economic aspects, are not included in peace talks, it will not be possible to ensure the stability of any treaties at the political level. It is also vital that all of the players involved are included. Above all, however, it is the people living in the Casamance region, who have lived with this conflict for nearly 30 years, who represent the starting point for a peace process and the further development of the region. The local civil society has assumed the task of promoting peace in Casamance first and foremost at the micro-level. Only if they succeed in resisting attempts by both sides to exploit the population for their benefit, will Casamance have a real chance.  


Jean-Claude Marut, 1994. “Le Mythe – penser la Casamance”, in: Francois George Barbier-Wiesser (ed.), Comprendre la Casamance – Chronique d’une intégration contrastée.Kathala.

Annie Chéneau-Locay, 1994. “La raison – Géographie des Casamance”, in: Francois George Barbier-Wiesser (ed.), Comprendre la Casamance – Chronique d’une integration contrastée. Kathala.

Bocounta Diallo, 2009. La Crise Casamancaise – Problématique et voies des solutions. Paris.

Ibid., 27

Ibid., 28

Evans,2004. Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocra-tiques de la Casamance (MFDC), (AFP Briefing Paper, Chatham House.

Vincent Foucher et al. Eurozine, 2004. Die Regierung des Senegal verfängt sich in Widersprüchen.

Amnesty International, Senegal: Climate of Terror in Casamance (1998, AI Index: AFR 49/01/98), 5 et seq.

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s overseas office in Dakar: (accessed July 5, 2012)


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To Whom It May Concern,

I am very interested in this paper and the topics discussed. Is this piece from an actual book, academic thesis or dissertation, or the like? If so, I'd like to know the reference, as well as obtain an electronic copy (PDF), if possible.

I just returned from conducting field research in Casamance. I was looking at conflict management cultural norms of the Fula (In Nigeria you called them Fulani) ethnic group within the conflict area of the region.

Let me know, and thank you in advance.
Yours in development,
Jam tun (peace only)

Travis J. Warrington
  Returned Peace Corps Volunteer/The Republic of The Gambia '08-'10
  David L. Boren Fellow to Senegal 2012
  Dual MA Candidate: Sustainable International Development & Coexistence and Conflict- 2012
  The Heller School for Social Policy and Management @ Brandeis University
    Email:       Web:


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